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APPLYING
COSTS, RISKS, AND VALUES EVALUATION (CRAVE) M]ETHODOLOGY
TO
ENGINEERING SUPPORT REQUEST (ESR) PRIORITIZATION
Executive Summary
Given Limited budget, the problem of prioritization among Engineering Support Requests
(ESRs) with varied sizes, shapes, and colors is a difficuit one. At the Kennedy Space
Center (KSC), the recently developed 4-Matrix (4-M) method represents a step in the
right direction as it attempts to combine the traditional criteria of technical merits only
with the new concern for cost-effectiveness. However, the 4--M method was not
adequately successful in the actual priofitization of ESRs for the fiscal year, 1995
(FY95). This research identifies a number of design issues that should help us develop
better methods. It emphasizes that given the variety and diversity of ESRs one should not
expect that a single method could help in the assessment of all ESRs. One conclusion is
that a methodology such as Costs, Risks, and Values Evaluation (CRAVE) should be
adopted. It also is clear that the development of methods such as 4-M requires input not
only from engineers with technical expertise in ESRs but also from personnel with
adequate background in the theory and practice of cost-effectiveness analysis.
At KSC, ESR priodtization is one part of the Ground Support Working Teams (GSWT)
Integration Process. It was discovered that the more important barriers to the
incorporation of cost-effectiveness considerations in ESR prioritization lie in this
process. The culture of integration, and the corresponding structure of review by a
committee of peers, is not conducive to the analysis and confrontation necessary in the
assessmem and prioritization of ESRs. Without assistance from appropriately trained
analyst(s) charged with the responsibility to analyze and be confrontational about each
ESR, the GSWT steering committee wi11 continue to make its decisions based on
incomplete understanding, inconsistent numbers, and at times, colored facts. The current
organizational separation of the prioritization and the funding processes is also identified
as an important barrier to the pursuit of cost-effectiveness. Perhaps the greatest barrier is
that, at the working level, KSC's culture is so preoccupied with technical concerns that it
seems almost oblivious to any cost concerns, let alone cost-effectiveness concerns. It is
recommended that we must urgently begin to change that culture and seek a better
balance between these two concerns.
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1. BACKGROUND
"Our team pledges the highest level of performance at the lowest possible
cost within the framework of absolute dedication to safety and quality to
meet the National Space Initiatives and challenges of today and the 21st
Century."
From p.3 of the March 24, 1994 document,
Implementation of the KSC 1994 Strategic Management Plan
To keep this pledge, at KSC, decisions such as which engineering support requests
(ESRs) to fund and at what level must be based on sound cost-benefit / cost-effectiveness
analyses (CBA). Toraskar and loglekar [1993] have shown that although CBA theory
contains rich concepts and sound principles, its practice is often based on overly
simplified and narrow techniques supplemented with numerous convenient but incorrect
assumptions. Consequently, often the practice of CBA is trapped in the type of vicious
circle [See Exhibit 1] I observed last year, here at KSC, in the context of advanced
software decision-making [loglekar, 1993].
In order to break out of such vicious circles, we must use a methodology such as Costs,
Risks, and Values Evaluation (CRAVE). A methodology is a way of thinking -- armed
with certain fundamental principles and concepts -- and a way of analyzing available
decision alternatives using situationally appropriate techniques and tools from a large
body of methods consistent with the fundamental principles and concepts. A
methodology focuses on both the techniques and the processes used in relevant decision-
making. Joglekar and Toraskar [1994] have explained exactly what CRAVE is, and how
it is supposed to work. Exhibit 2 captures Joglekar and Toraskar's prescription for the
process of applying CRAVE written in the context of global technology deployment
(GTD) decisions. The six-stage process emphasizes some of the fundamentals of
CRAVE, such as
• the need for context articulation,
• the recognition that cost-benefit estimation is in itself a cosdy process and
sometimes the benefits of estimation do not justify the costs,
• the recognition that it is not necessary to force quantification on certain
consequences that are truly non-quantifiable
• the recognitionthat measurement and valuation should not be confused as one
and the same; valuation of a consequence is in the eye of the beholder, and
hence a multi- perspective analysis is more desirable than a single perspective
analysis.
V
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As Exhibit 3 shows, CtL4,VE retains some of the fundamental principles and .looks
forward to the use of many rich typologies and concepts of classical CBA. Yet, CRAVE
attempts to overcome the typical flaws in the practice of traditional CBA. Exhibit 4
shows how CRAVE differs from classical CBA practice. [For a fuller understanding of
CRAVE, see Jogtekar and Tomskar, i994].
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2. THE TASK THIS YEAR
This year, Bob Lang, Director of Vehicle Engineering, asked me to
(a) See how CRAVE could be applied to the problem of ESR prioritization, and
(b) Recommend a method for future use.
Given that
i.
2.
3.
task, I tried to understand:
What exactly an ESR is, how varied ESRs are from one another, and what
kinds of peculiarities characterize some of the ESRs;
What explicit and implicit criteria are currently used in the prioritization of
ESRs; and
What process is currently used in tile prioritization of ESRs.
Clearly, my understanding of these three topics was not a linear but a parallel process,
with the understanding of one topic influencing the understanding of other topics, and
vice versa. It follows that readers who want to truly grasp my total understanding may
want to read this report and its appendices at Ieast twice in its entirety.
Briefly, an ESR is a proposal to upgrade an equipment or a facility used in the "ground
processing" (all the work done between one landing and the next launch) of a space
shuttle. An ESR seeks one or more of desired goals such as improving flight safety,
improving safety of ground processing operations, overcoming system obsolescence,
avoiding schedule delays, and reducing processing costs. At KSC, there are over thirty
engineering systems (represented by their GSWT teams) that are together seeking
funding for some 200 different ESRs, each costing anywhere between a few thousand to
a few million dollars. Given limited resources, only a few of these ESRs can be fully or
partly funded in any #ven year.
The benefits sought by some ESRs are considered so criticalto the strategic objectives of
KSC that these ESRs are designated as Category 1 (i.e., mandatory), and they are
implemented expeditiously. This research is focused on the prioritization of Category 2
(i.e., desirable but optional) ESRs, where cost-effectiveness analysis ought to be useful.
However, as Appendix A explains, historically, even Category 2 ESRs were prioritized
by using a system called "P-cut rating," which extended the notion of "requited" versus
"desirable" within Category 2. Cost-effectiveness considerations were simply left out.
(See attachments A-1 and A-2).
Therefore, I was pleasantly surprised to know that, to incorporate cost-effectiveness
considerations in the prioritization of Category 2 ESRs, recently, GSWT steering
committee had developed a new approach, named "the 4-Matrix (,l-M) method." (See
Attachment A-3). Clearly, the 4-M method represents a step in the right direction, and
its designers must be applauded for their courage in breaking away from the tradition of
focusing exclusively on the technical merits of an ESR.
V
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On the other hand, it seems that the designers had no help from anyone with the proper
background in the theory and practice of cost-effectiveneSs-_alysis. Consequendy, the
design shows numerous flaws detailed in Appendix A, including:
.
.
o
4.
5.
°
The 4-M method ignores two over-riding considerations at KSC, namely
safety and obsolescence.
The 4-M method actually focuses on two primary factors:
(a) Expected annual impact on flow schedule, and
(b) Payback period.
A multiplicative model is inappropriate for the 4-M method.
The design of the rating categories and score ranges is inappropriate.
The absence of relevant probability considerations on the Cost Assessment
Worksheet is inappropriate.
The language is ambiguous, and instructions / explanations are lacking.
As a consequence of these design flaws, the 4-M method was not successful in assisting
the prioritization of FY95 ESRs. Table 1 and Figures 1, 2, and 3 confirm this lack of
success by showing that there is no relationship between the steering committee's actual
priorities and either the cost or the payback or the ESR scores.
These and other design flaws are also manifest in the assessments of specific ESRs
reviewed in Appendix B. As can be seen, the design of 4-M leads to a variety of
instances of misrepresentations and overestimation of the benefits. At the same time,
there are instances of ESRs for which 4-M worksheets are very difficult to use. Some of
the comments in Appendix B further show that we seem to aggravate the problem of
comparing ESRs by lumping together ESRs costing $4M with those costing $4K. Figure
4 graphically shows how a single one of the top 17 ESRs accounts for over 66% of the
funding needed by all 17 put together. CIearly, ESRs requiring capitai expenditures
ought to be evaluated and funded separately from ESRs requiring a few thousand dollars.
Most importantly, the variety of sizes, shapes, and colors of ESRs captured by AppendLx
B makes it clear that the presumption of being able to create a single method to fit all
ESRs is unrealistic. What we need is a methodology, and not a method. A methodology
allows for the use of several different methods of analysis depending on the nature of the
technical system, the type of modification sought, and the relevant costs and benefits.
Despite the shortcomings of the 4-M method, we must not abandon the pursuit of cost-
benefit analysis, or return to the arbitrary decision making of the past. Instead, we must
evolve towards the adoption of a methodology such as Costs, Risks, and Values
Evaluation (CRAVE).
In any case, the most important reasons for the lack of success of the 4--M method lie in
the GSWT integration process. The latter part of Appendix A discusses these process
issues in depth. Here, by way of conclusion, I simply want to list several process related
barriers to the application of CRAVE, and my recommendations to management for
overcoming those barriers.
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BARRIERS AND CORRESPONDING RECOMMENDATIONS
Barrier 1.
We are trying to develop a single method to assess all ESRs.
However, ESR.s come in a variety of sizes, shapes and colors.
Their assessment calls for a methodology - a collection of methods, along with
the knowledge of which one to use when.
Recommendation:
Adopt CRAVE.
Barrier 2.
We leave the development of a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) method to engineers
who do not have the necessary background in the theory and practice of CBA.
Recommendations:
Get expert help.
Develop internal expertise through training.
Barrier 3.
The culture of "integration" (and the corresponding structure of review by a
committee of peers) is not conducive to the analysis and confrontation necessary
for objective assessment of each ESR., and the subsequent rational prioritization
among them.
This is true whether the assessment criteria include cost considerations or not.
Recommendation:
Let the GSWT steering committee be assisted by appropriately trained, objective
analysts, charged with the responsibility to analyze and be confrontational about
each ESR.
V
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Barrier 4.
Organizational separation of the prioritizadon, funding, and
processes is not conducive to the pursuit of cost-effectiveness.
implementation
Recommendation:
To the extent possible, centralize the authority to prioritize, fund, and monitor
implementation of ESRs.
At least, coordinate sufficiently to make sure that decisions in these three
processes are based on the same criteria, and on an appreciation of each others'
reasoning and deliberations.
Barrier 5 (The Most Important One).
At the working level, KSC's culture is almost oblivious to any cost concerns, let
alone cost-effectiveness concerns.
Recommendation:
Begin to change the culture by
• insisting on a discussion of costs, and paybacks at meetings to review priority
list, and at funding decision meetings,
• tracking and monitoring the estimated and actuai costs of ESRs approved in
prior years,
• setting up a program of training in CBA / CRAVE concepts and principles.
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Exhibit 1
L_ng resoumas, and _e necessary
exce_se in ec_norrac r=qaiy_is. _ut
,mi_ vested fnteres',s in just_ying _eir
proiec_. ¢our-_:je_us software engineers
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i_._-m%::za_onotdecsions arcady made.
Man_jement _1_ few reso_.
a_ leaves _e c_nc_uc: ot C_As uo ,_
_e initiagve at _e son'ware engineers
invotvea In soecflc pmiec:_.
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A
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A Process for Applying CRAVE Methodology to GTD Decisions
Stage l: C_ntext Ar:lculatlon
[dentdy av_l_nle cecsion alternatives.
_denth'yall_zkeholders
Guess:imate upper :,nd lower _ounds
Oeiine horizon.
L.Js:assum.pticns
I
!
T,vS
Rec,:rd ;he reasons _or
future referenc8
Stage 2: Enumeration of
these change= due to new technology
- Usa or rescurcas,
P roduc:ivity,
Profitability.
Strategic4it. and
- Risks (tacnniczl. schedule, operational)
during anC attar tecnnolo_/ deoloymenL
in all pertinent organizations
- $consortng department.
- .=..&O lunc:Jon.
- .==reign sunsidiary.
- .=scent corporation.
- Hcsi c=uc,t_
I
"_ Stage 3: Measurement Is=u-'-,
- Pro0er\ basa-_ines.
I - Joint usa of resources,
- Cc._rcducars
I
'_F---_tage -!.: Valuation
._ A_mcctate alternative marne-, based on:
_ersoecdve-_ .=_rsoec=ve-?. - - - Perspec':;ve-n
.:rovide
a clear and c=mp:ete
_escriptlon
I
Provide a c._ear aria
com::te'.e _e,cc.*iptton
fror:'1 ,ac.'1 _erspective
m
T
! S_.age S: Adiustments for: and Sensitivity analysis with
- grne value at money, alternatrve zssumpuons
- risks,
- _:c_aoiiities c:t ax,stancz" of :he c=_rcauc rs
Stage 6: Final A_ses',ment
Comcining _e value<: z_d :he unvaJueo from muRiole _ersoe_:ves.
man_cjement snculd:
- acprove/disaoorove G,TO =acs_cn.
- re_mmanc_ moaific-__ton ot :er_hnolo_y 2,an
- provide _ee<:hac _.:o C.'qAVE s;aff-grcuu
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Exhibit 3
Some Commonalties in CBA and CRAVE Methodologies
I= Fundamental principles such as:
• Formal and expiici analysis
• Accounting for ail incremental costs and benefits
• Accounting for costs and benefits to whomsoever they accrue
• Adjusting for time value of various costs and benefits
• ExpEck recom=dtion or'assumptions, and performance
of sensitivity analysis for alternative assumptions
m=
Use of t ypologies of costs and benefits such as:
Fixed and variable
• Direc_ and indirec:.
• Obvious and hidden.
• Primal, Secondary, tertiary
• One-dine and recurrent
• Controllable and non-controllabte
. Use of rich concepts such as:
• Opportunity costs
• Pareto-supe,, iority
- Joint use of resources
• Cause-effec: versus multi-producers-single-product relationships
A,),_ It
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Exhibit 4
A CONLP._q.ISON OF CUR.RENT CBA PtL-XCTICE
WIT_t CRAVE ,.'vEETttODOLOGY
CBA PRACTICE
Justification focus
Retrospective
Technique-oriented
Single-perspective assessment
Consolidation of multiple stakeholders'
criteria (possibly .A_HP type)
Forced quantification of the
non-quantifiable
Le_ to the proponents of specific GTDs
Le._ to non-expels with certain recipes
PotentiaJ for advocacy, ynored
Economic values only
Risks of non-e..'d_ence or" co-producers
{gnored
Consideration Of internal risks oniy
Stringent financial criteria
Short-sighted perspective
Product-oriented (i.e. C/B ratio, or _R.)
Zero valuation of non-quantified
intangibles
Measurement and valuation
confused with one another
Evaluating _ven aitemarives
Often unrealistically long horizons
Ad hoc methods and assumptions
CRA V'F, M_T_O DO LOGY
Decision Assistance focus
Prospective
It is a methodology
Mutti-gerspective assessment
No simple consolidation
(concept of Pareto superiority.)
Quantification omy when possible
Actively directed by the M2qC managers /
decision makers
Guided by a me,.hodologist
PotentiaJ for advocacy, activeiy managed
Economic and non-economic values
Risks of non-e.'dstence of co-producers
expiicidy accounted for
Consideration of both internal and e_emal risks
More realistic criteria
Balanced perspective
Process-oriented
Exoiicitconsideration of non-quantified
intan_bles
Measurement separated from valuation
Helping construction of better alternatives
Weil-defined. reasonabiy Iong but limited horizons
Consiszenr me._hodolog_y and assumpdons
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Priority #
I
Summary
ESR #
J Table 1 ! ! I
I I i I !
Data on The Steerinq Committee's Top 17 ESRs
Costs
( $' 000 )
Payback
(months)
ESR
Score
Old Category
1 k'15040 $108 12 1-s
2 k15813 $16 17 1-M
$29k15399
Category
/P-cut
144 2-s
80 2-s
36 2-s
60 24 I<14453 $3.800 1-M
I
5 kl 1794 $340 0 375 2 1-s
6 k'15783 $,305 NA 60 2 1-M
7 k'15505 $4 NAt 40 2-s
8 k15836 $58 7 240
9 Jk'15569 $35 264 9 !
10 k15825 NA NAI 60 P4-3
i
I
, 11 !k14887 $22 10 180
' 112 Ik15317 $470 12 240 P4-I
18oJ
I
k15818;i 13 $46 7
i k_58S5 i! 14 $2 3 256f
' 30{ Ii 15 f k14213 $84 84,000
i k15626 $472 34 40ji 16
k15602 J! 17 $26 16 601
i 1
i j
v
279
13
F_OD-RE 1
ESR Costs and Priorities
4ooo i
I
i
I
rr i
cO 3000 i- .........
w !
t
..C l
2000 %.........
o I
I
I
o 1000 - .........
i
I
T
I
i
0
1 3 5 7 9 11
Steering Committee's
13 15 t7
Priority #
280
711-
I,J
co
--_.i
O0
09
r,,I-,
d)
d) 01
ai.,O O
O"q
0
B
Elco
d
J.
0 "-_
0"1
Payback Period (months)
--_ IX) CO 4:_ 01 Ob "-,1
0 0 0 C) 0 0 0 0
--'---I .... '--I .... I---I--I .... I---,---,I---,---t---t---
| i !
,/i i i _ |• | i i i
i i t
"1:1
0
"11
ill
0
roll
:1:1:
,,,,4
L'-J
1',,3
CO
I'0
03
GO
d) r.rl
(E)
0--.4
0
3
ES R Score
--_ bO
0 0
0 0 0
"
o
g |
ffi _ |\i :-...
"13
0 "-_
--_ 03
"--.!
i
03 -i_
0 0
0 0
ITI
0
0
--I
roll
0
--I
Ull
i-I-
:1:1:
C
h3
0O
CO
ci
--..k
Ol
CO
(3)
(3)
(30
o_
V
C)
01
ITI
(I)
(/)
0
m
C)
0
17
Appendix A
A Critique of the 4-Matrix (4-M) Method of ESR Assessment
by
Praf Joglekar
The Ground Systems Working Teams (GSWT) Steering Committee has a difficult task:
Prioritization among hundreds of worthy Engineering Support Requests 0ESR). These
ESRs come from some 31 different vehicle, payload, and facility systems. Individual ESRs
cost anywhere between a few thousand to a few million dollars, and seek one or more of
KSC's goals of improving safety, avoiding delays in flow-critical activities, reducing
obsolescence, and reducing operations and maintenance (O&M) costs. At the same time,
an important concern at KSC is that the modifications done by one engineering system
must not adversely affect the functioning of other engineering systems vital to the
processing of the shuttle. Thus, the process of ESR prioritization is actually called,
"GSWT Integration." Attachment A-1 describes this process and its ground rules as
of August 1993.
To understand the first ground rule, it should be realized that there is a system of
designating ESRs as either Category 1 (i.e., mandatory) or Category 2 (i.e., highly
desirable, but not mandatory). Suffixes such as S, M, or E are added to these categories to
indicate whether ESR attempts to address a safety, or management, or environmental
requirement. The ultimate authority for all ESR category designation rests with the
Ground Review Board (GRB). The funding and approval of Category 1 ESRs is outside
the GSWT process, which focuses on prioritizing within Category 2 ESRs.
To compare ESRs with one another and prioritize them is similar to comparing and rank-
ordering hundreds of apples, oranges, bananas, strawberries, and watermelons, flu.it by
fruit! Each faxfit comes in a variety of sizes, shapes, colors, and ripening stages. To
complicate the matter further, the fruits come in a variety of semi-transparent packages
designed to exaggerate their attractiveness. Some flu.its sell by the pound, other by the
piece, still other by the package. For some quantity discounts are available, for some
others their are cost-premiums associated with the timing of purchase. We want to
maximize the nutritional value, the taste, the flavor and still be within our budget, which
will be determined at future dates by several different funding authorities!
As I understand it, in the past, this comparison and rank-ordering was not a major
problem. We had resources to buy plenty of each kind of fruit. Even ESRs that were not
funded in a given year were seen as simply deferred for implementation in a year or two.
Thus, as described in Attachment A-1, we prioritized ESRs on the basis of their technical
merit (perhaps a euphemism for subjective judgment based on such inputs as which team
makes the best presentation, who is championing an ES1L which team is screaming the
loudest, etc.), with practically no r_ard to what they cost.
284
18
To assist the steering committee in its assessment of the technical merits, GSWT teams
were encouraged to assign a "P-cut" rating to individual ESRs.Attachment A-2 presents
the P-cut definitions. Although, the GSWT steering committee is charged to consider only
Category 2 (desirable but not mandatory) ESRs, the P-cut system extended the concept of
mandatory versus desirable nature of ESRs to several levels within Category 2 by focusing
on the reasons underlying the modifications sought by the ESRs, and within Category, 2
ESRs getting Pl, P2, or P3 ratings were seen as required[. The differences in the costs of
various ESRs were not seen as an important consideration, and even highly cost-efficient
ESRs (those promising a payback in Iess than one year) received a low priority of P4-2,
practically ensuring that we will never get around to these ESRs with the limited available
funds.
Over the last three years, the resources available for NASA, in general, and for ESRs in
particular have shrunk dramatically. Now, we must be cost-conscious and choose between
competing ESRs systematically and rationally. In other words, today we must base our
decisions not only on technical merit but also on cost-effectiveness considerations.
Recognizing this need for cost-effectiveness considerations, the GSWT Steering
Committee recently developed and implemented a method called the 4-Matrix (4-M)
method of ESR assessment. See Attachment A-3 for the description of the method,
the forms used, and the accompanying instructions.
The designers of 4-M method must be applauded for their courage in breaking away
from the established culture at KSC which is oblivious to any cost considerations: let
alone consideration of cost-effectiveness. 4-M represents a first attempt at bringing a
degree of rationality to the process of rank-ordering ESRs. This method must evolve and
lead to a sounder methodology in the future. The critique here is intended to assist in that
evolution. It must not undermine the credit for a pioneering effort on the part of the
designers of &M.
I had the oppommity to study how the 4-M method worked in the steering committee's
rank-ordering of the top 17 Vehicle Engineering (TV) related ESRs for FY95. Table 1
summarizes the data on cost, payback period, and ESR score, for each of the top 17
ESRs. In addition, I have included the Category / P-cut rating, where available. Finally, i
was told that some of these top 17 ESRs were originally in Category 1 but were
downgraded to Category 2. The Column "Old Category" reports this information.
As can be seen from Table 1, an ESR's priority does not seem to be related to either the
size of the project (as defined by its cost), or its payback period, or the ESR score.
Figures i, 2, and 3 graphically demonstrate the lack of these relationships. In short, the
steering committee's priority order cannot be explained by any of these factors. It follows
that the 4-M method does not seem to help in the rank-ordering of ESRs. There are
several reasons why. Here, these reasons are grouped in two major areas: issues pertaining
to the design of the 4-M method, and those pertaining to the GSWT process.
285
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DESIGN ISSUES:
. The 4-M method ignores two over-riding considerations at KSC, namely
SAFETY and OBSOLESCENCE.
There is no factor to assess the seyerity of the consequences of potential mishaps caused
by the existing equipment or facilities in terms of injury to personnel, or damage to the
orbiter or the payloads. Nor is there a factor to assess the obsolescence and lack of
supportability of the e,-_is6ng equipment or facilities. Thus, in addition to the ESR scores,
the GSWT Steering Committee has to consider these factors. Since at KSC, safety is
indeed our Number 1 concern, it is natural that we give a high priority to safety related
ESRs regardless of their 4-M scores. The "category" and "old category" information in
Table 1 confirms this. ESRs that had an Old Category 1, and those with 2-s designation
seem to be at the top of the list of 17 regardless of their costs, ESR scores, or payback
periods.
. The 4-M method actually focuses on two primary factors:
(a) Expected annual impact on flow schedule, and
(b) Payback period.
Note that three of the four factors in the 4--M method, namely
i. Frequency of Operation
ii. Processing Impact/Improvement
iii. Likelihood of Occurrence
when multiplied together, basically give us a score for the expected annual impact on
flow schedule.
The payback period is calculated separately in the Cost Assessment Worksheet.
3. A multiplicative model is inappropriate for the 4-M method.
In theory, if all incremental costs, risks, and benefits can be identified, measured, and
valued in dollar terms, the calculated Payback period should be the sole criterion for
rank-ordering ESRs. The shorter the Payback, the more desirable the ESIL
However, often k is difficult, if not impossible, to measure and value in dollar terms
factors such as Safety Improvement, Obsolescence Reduction, and Avoidance of Schedule
Delays. In that case, it makes sense to use a factor scoring and weighting method. But
the scores on such factors should not be multiplied with each other or with the score on
Payback. What we need is a weighted average of the scores. The weights have to be
carefu/ly chosen to reflect the values of the organization. A method called the Analytical
Hierarchy Process (AHP) is most helpful in the development of proper weights, and
KSC should explore its application.
V
W
286
iii!-
2O
4. The design of the rating categories and score ranges is inappropriate.
4-M's multiplicative approach is particularly inappropriate since, by design, the score for
Expected Schedule Impact can range from 1 to 100 while the score for Payback can range
only from 1 to 5. Thus, 4-M is biased towards minimizing the importance of Payback.
This bias is further accentuated by the fact that all ESRs providing a longer than 2-year
payback (including those that may never payback) receive a rating of 1, while ESRs
providing a payback within 3 months receive a rating of only 5. I believe this is totally
inappropriate.
The way I see it, provided the payback calculations are reasonably valid and
accurate, all ESRs promising a payback within one year deserve to be immediately
funded. That will have more money (or other resources) at the end of the year than we
had at the beginning, and those increased resources would be available for the pursuit of
our other goals such as increased safety. Even ESRs promising a payback within 4 years
are highly desirable. They represent better than 20% per year compounded rate of return.
On the other hand ESRs that take longer than 5 years to payback should be considered
undesirable unless they promise significant improvements on one or more of the non-
quantifiable dimensions of safety, obsolescence, or schedule.
Thus, I believe that 4-M's design of the rating categories as well as possible range of
scores for the Payback factor are inappropriate.
An important attribute of properly designed rating categories is that they are mutually
exclusive (i.e., non-overlapping) and collectively exhaustive (i.e., no possibility should be
left out). Unfortunately, in 4--M we see both of these attributes violated:
The critical path (i.e., serial flow) nature of an operation seems to be double-counted,
once in the Frequency of Operation factor, and again in the Processing Impact/
Improvement factor.
The categories in the Likelihood of Occurrence factor provide no room for the rating
of a mishap that is expected to happen no earLier than 18 months and no later than 24
months. Thus, the categories here are not collectively e.'rahaustive.
Given that we have already accounted for the frequency of an operation, the likelihood
of occurrence factor should refer to likelihood per operation, rather than likelihood
per year. This is a second example of double-counting certain factors.
. The absence of relevant probability considerations on the Cost Assessment
Work.sheet is inappropriate.
Many ESRs are desired to avoid potential mishaps likely to be caused by e_sting
equipment or facilities, and hence will contribute their estimated savings in "annual
corrective manhours and materials" only with the probability of occurrence of the mishap. -
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The expected savings are the product of this probability times the estimated savings. Yet,
the Cost Assessment Work.sheet does not require an estimation of the relevant probability.
Consequently, the computation implicitly assumes that the mishap would occur with
certainty. The net result is that typically, 4-M's Cost Assessment Worksheet
underestimates the payback period. (For an example, see comments on ki5836 in
Appendix B).
6. The language is ambiguous, and instructions / explanations are lacking.
One well-known short-coming of cost-benefit analysis ks that it can easily become an
instrument of intentional or unintentional biases introduced by the champions and
advocates of specific projects. Therefore, in designing a cost-benefit assessment method,
one has to be extra careful and try to minimize opportunities for the introduction of such
biases, and convenient misinterpretations of the words and phrases chosen. Unfortunately,
4-M is fertile with many opportunities for the introduction of such biases:
• One factor is defined simply as "Processing Impact / Improvement," without any
further insu-uction. The designers of 4-M assume that there will never be an ESR that
will actually negatively impact the flow schedule. But the fact is, in some cases for the
sake of safety, we may introduce new procedures that could actually delay a shuttle's
serial flow. For such an ESR, the designers of 4-M would like to see that the lowest
rating of 1 is used. However, the lead engineer who knows that the concerned
operation ks a serial one, refuses to use a 1 or a 2. Indeed, one cannot blame a lead
engineer whose ESR introduces a 24-hour serial delay if he/she chose to rate the ESR
as a "5."
4-M asks that an operation's frequency be rated either as a "5 Multiple times per flow"
/ month," or as a "4 Once per flow / month." Given the ambiguity in the phrase "per
flow / month," we just cannot blame a champion, whose ESR truly deserves a "4," if
he/she rates it a "5." After all, if the operation is once a month, then it is clearly
multiple times per flow since a flow lasts for several months. If the operation is once
per flow, given the overlapping nature of several shuttle flows, in many months in a
year the operation may be done multiple times a month!
The designers of 4-M use the phrase "likelihood of occurrence" to refer to the
"probability that a mishap or 'problem condition' would occur unless an ESR was
implemented". Yet, several lead engineers I have talked to assume it to mean the
"probability that the operation will be done within the n_t so many flows." (See
comments on k15813 in Appendix B).
Among those who realize that "likelihood of occurrence" referred to the probability of
a mishap, many say that faced with the choice between rating their ESR a "3 Could
happen within next 4 flows / 6 months" or a "2 Could happen within next 8 flows / 12
months," they invariably choose a "3" rather than a "2." As one lead engineer puts it,
288
]! | I
22
_J
PROCESS ISSUES:
1. KSC culture is not cost-conscious.
The greatest single barrier to the implementation of any method of cost-effectiveness
analysis at KSC is KSC's culture which is almost oblivious to any cost concerns, let
alone cost-effectiveness concerns. In the GSWT process this lack of cost-consciousness
is evident in many ways:
• As Tabie 1 and my Appendix B comments on k14453 show, the GSWT process does
not distinguish between a $4K ESR and a $4M ESR.
Note from Table 1 that the steering committee has included k15825 in its list of Top
I7 ESRs even though there is no rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimate of its
cost. In other words, the ESR could cost anywhere between a few thousand to a few
million dollars, and it would still be Priority #10 on the list.
At the Thursday morning meetings of the steering committee, often a report is given
on the status of ESRs approved in prior years. While that report includes information
on which ESRs are complete, which ones are behind schedule and by how much, etc.,
there is no information on the original cost estimates and actual expenditures on
the various ESRs. In fact, I am told that the way our accounting system is set up, it
just cannot track and monitor ESR by ESR expenses.
At the June 28, 1994 meeting to review TV's FY 95 priority list, management did
not raise any questions about costs, paybacks, or the 4-M scores of any of the
ESRs. The steering committee also did not make any attempt to defend its priority list
using any one of these cost-related considerations.
Given this culture, most engineers do not take ESR cost estimates seriously. Even
those who are charged with arriving at the estimates freely admit that their estimates
could be wrong by 50-60%. Others put the expected margins of errors to be as high as
80-100%! Given that, for many ESRs, benefits are inherently more difficult to quantify
and measure, sometimes we even see instances of carelessly exaggerated claims. (See
Appendix B comments on k11794). Others see no need to even attempt to quantify the
benefits of their ESRs, or report any 4-M scores. They know very well that as long as
their ESR can claim to be a "mission-stopper," it will be funded regardless of costs. Some
team members speculated that the 4-M method creates the paperwork necessary to
pretend to Washington DC that we are cost-conscious.
Thus, I was not surprised that many teams had not read 4-M instructions carefully, and
made such elementary mistakes as addition in place of multiplication, or reporting payback
in years as payback in months (See Appendix B comments on k15040).
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. Organizational separation of the prioritization, ftinding, and implementation
processes is not cond:_.ch'e to the pursuit of cost-effectiveness.
The second most important reason why any method of cost-effectiveness analysis would
be very difficult to implement in the GSWT process is the organizational separation of the
process that does the prioritization from the process that provides the funding, which in
turn, is separated from the process that ensures actual implementation of an ESR. While
GSWT teams and steering committee are asked to prioritize the ESRs, they have no
authority to actually fund or implement any ESR. The consequences of this separation
are:
It perpetuates the culture of a lack of cost-consciousness, and GSWT teams and
steering committee are likely to continue to focus exclusively on technical merit and
ignore all cost considerations.
It causes considerable frustration for the teams and the steering committee
insofar as the funding mechanism can override the priorities set by the GSWT
integration process, and the implementation mechanism (i.e., Design Engineering [DE]
and Shop Floor [SF] ) can easily re-arrange those priorities by allocating or not
allocating the necessary manpower to specific ESRs. Furthermore, even if the steering
committee wants to use cost-effectiveness as an important criterion, given that our
long standing culture is so deeply ingrained throughout KSC, DE and/or SF may
continue to use technical merit as the sole criterion in deciding which ESRs to work
ftrst, if at all.
Both, the total manpower spent, and the calendar time needed, for all this
prioritization, funding, and implementation is inordinately high. In other words, the
bureaucracy is perpetuated.
. The culture of integration is not conducive to the analysis and confrontation
necessary in a rational prioritization among competing investment
alternatives. /
At KSC, the ESR prioritization process is called "GSWT integration process," and it is
left to a committee consisting of representatives of several GSWT teams (i.e., a committee
of peers). This is consistent with KSC's long standing tradition ef decision-making by
consensus developing teams. The GSWT integration process should help ensure that one
team's ESR does not interfere with the functioning of other team's systems. However, it
may not be the most productive process for prioritization among competing demands on
limited resources. Appendix B clearly shows that for a rational prioritization of ESRs, we
need considerable analysis and confrontation.
As members of "an integration process," individuals on the steering committee are inclined
to respect the expertise and trust the integrity and judgment of individual teams. For
example, from Attachment A-I, page 2, note that a team's internal priorities of its ESR_
V
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are not to be questioned by the steering committee. Yet, as is clear from Appendix B,
these teams have no expertise in cost-benefit estimation. Consequently, a team's cost-
benefit estimates may be way off the mark, and its internal priorities may be based on such
erroneous estimates. On the other hand, GSWT teams do have substantial vested interests
in making their ESR look as attractive as possible. Consequently, a team may be
misrepresenting the true benefits (see Appendix B comments on k15040), or
overestimating the magnitude of those benefits (see Appendix B comments on k15813,
k11794, and k15836).
. The need for a properly trained and impartial analyst to assist the steering
committee.
Of course, even if we renamed the GSWT Steering Committee as "ESR Prioritization
Committee," we will not get the necessary degree of analysis and confrontation from this
committee, for several reasons:
• First, most members of the committee do not have the necessary background or
training to do the kind of analysis I have done.
Second, given that
a) serving on the steering committee is only one tenth of one's job, and
b) the number of ESRs to consider is very large
(48 were considered in prioritizing the TV list),
no one has the time to check the claims, the assumptions, and the computational
accuracy of each one of the ESRs.
Third, in a structured team, members of the team could be assigned to check out
specific ESRs, ensuring that each ESR is checked by one or more team members. In a
committee of peers, such a division of labor is very difficult.
FmaUy, a committee of peers thrives on the collegiality of its members. Such a
committee hates confrontational members, and no individual is likely to volunteer to be
a confrontational member.
Thus, if the GSWT steering committee truly wants to use cost-effectiveness as a criterion
in its prioritization of ESRs, it must seek assistance from a properly trained, impartial
analyst who is charged to be confrontational about every ESR, its logic, cost-benefit
estimates, computational accuracy, etc.
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"Almost anything that could happen over the next 12 months, could also happen over
the next 6 months, except perhaps an increase in my salary."
.=
Although the instructions are to multiply the scores on the four matrices to obtain the
total score, the use of the word "'total" seems to have led some teams to add the
scores on the four matrices. (See comments on k15813 in Appendix B).
g The presumption of being able to create a single method to fit all ESRs is
unrealistic.
When we force different discipline engineers to all use particular forms, and a Nven set of
cost categories, we soon discover that our method does not quite fit all the systems we are
trying to evaluate. There are many tell-tale signs that the 4-M method does not fit all
ESRs.
* 7 (15%) of the top 48 ESRs for FY95 were submitted without an attempt to fill out
either of the two forms of the 4--M method.
• 6 (13%) more filled out the ESR score form, but not the Cost Assessment Worksheet.
• Regardless, 3 of these "defiant" 13 wound up on the Steering Committee's list of the
top 17 ESRs.
• Those who did fill in the forms, often had to modify the cost assessment worksheet to
report the some of the unique costs or benefits of their system.
• For more specific examples of the inapplicability of 4-M method, see Append.Lx B.
The variety of technical disciplines the ESRs originate in, the diversity of benefits they
seek, the variety of risks they reduce, the many different types of costs they impose,
together suggest that to evaluate and rank-order these ESRs, what we need is a
methodology, and not a method. A methodology allows for the use of several different
methods of analysis depending on the nature of the technical system, the type of
modification sought, and the relevant costs and benefits. Thus, despite the shortcomings of
the 4-M method, we must not abandon the pursuit of cost-benefit analysis, or return to the
arbitrary decision making of the past. Instead, we must evolve towards the adoption of a
methodology such as Costs, Risks, and Values Evaluation (CRAVE).
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0GSWT INTEGRATION PROCESS
.............. II II Ii i inn ,i,
GROUNDRULES
(
0 ONLY CATEGORY 2, 2E, OR 2S ESR'S ARE CONSIDERED
0 TECHNICAL MERIT IS THE ONLY CRITERIA USED TO EVALUATE ESR'S
THROUGHOUT. THE INTEGRATION PROCESS
0 TI4E INTEGRATION PROCESS STARTS WITH THE TEAM LIST.
1',3
I,,,O
0 THE GSWT TEAM CONSISTING OF A NASA & LSOC SE AND AN SDE
FROM GSDE PRIORITIZE THE ESR'S WITHIN THEIR SYSTEM BY
TECHNICAL MERIT AND FISCAl_ YEAR.
0 THE NEXT LEVEL OF INTEGRATION (CALLED THE TV LIST) OCCURS
ONCE A YEAR.
0 THE GSWT STEERING COMMITTEE (S/C) REPRESENTATIVES FROM
TV, 17-01, AND 15-01 TAKE TI-IE TEAM LISTS FROM THEIR
F{ESPECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS AND INTEGRATE THESE ESR'S INTO A
SINGLE LIST.
8-19-93 , I
_----_.J'LocJcheed
, Space Operations Company
GSWT INTEGRATION PROCESS
I I I I I I
0 THE PROCESS WORKS AS FOLLOWS;
0 THE #1 PRIORITY ESR FROM EACH TEAM'S LIST ARE LAID ON THE
TABLE. THIS IS A TOTAL OF 22 ESR'S.
0 THE ESR'S ARE GROUPED BY P-CUT AN INDEX ASSIGNED TO THE
ESR BY THE GSWT TEAM. IT INDICATES THE SEVERITY OF THE
IMPACT OF NOT DOING THE REQUESTED MODIFICATION.
_J
_O
0 USING THE P-CUT, THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM
CONDITION AND THEIR EXPERIENCE AS A GUIDE, THE THREE S/C
REP'S SELECT WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE THE MOST
IMPORTANT ESR FROM THE ITEMS ON THE TABLE.
0 THE #2 PRIORITY FROM THAT TEAM (WHOSE ESR WAS SELECTED
AS MOST IMPORTANT) IS THEN BROUGHT UP ON THE TABLE AND
COMPETES AGAINST THE OTHER 21 ESR ALREADY ON THE TABLE.
0 THIS PROCESS CONTINUES UNTIL A SET NUMBER OF ITEMS HAVE
BEEN SELECTED. THIS IS THE TV LIST.
8-19-93 2 _------_Loc.kheed
Space Oparatlons Company
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GSWT INTEGRATION PROCESS
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THE TV LIST IS THEN SUBMITTED TO THE ENGINEERING DIRECTORS
FROM 17-01AND15-01,THE LSOC CHIEF ENGINEER, THE TV
ENGINEERING DIRECTOR, AND ALL TV DIVISION CHIEFS.
0 A MEETING IS CONVENED TO ALLOW REDLINES TO THE LIST TO BE
DISCUSSED AND INCORPORATED.
LO
Lrl
0 DURING THIS TIME, THE SUPPORT OPS AND TE ORGANIZATIONS ARE
PERFORMING THE SAME INTEGRATION FOR ESR'S FROM THEIR
TEAMS USING A SIMILAR PROCESS. THEIR EFFORT COMPILES THE T_E_E
LIST.
0 THE LAST STEP IN THE INTEGRATION IS PERFORMED BY THE GSWT
SIC INTEGRATION TEAM AND RESULTS IN THE FYXX GSWT
INTEGRATED PRIORITY LIST.
0 THIS TEAM CONSISTS OF THE S/C REPRESENTATIVES FROM TV, TE,
30-0, AND 17-01 (ALSO REPRESENTING 15-01). THE SIC CHAIRMAN
ATTENDS AND ACTS AS A TIE BREAKER IF REQUIRED.
1_-19-93 3
_--j_'Lockheed F,5Co
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GSWT INTEGRATION PROCESS
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THE TV AND TE LISTS ARE USED AT THIS LEVEL AND THE
INTEGRATION PROCESS IS THE SAME AS EARILER EXCEPT THERE
ARE ONLY 2 ESR'S ON THE TABLE AT ANY GIVEN TIME.
0 THE NUMBER OF ITEMS TO COMPRISE THE LIST IS DETERMINED BY
THE TEAM AT THE START OF THE PROCESS AND THE INTEGRATION
CONTINUES UNTIL THIS NUMBER IS REACHED.
_o
0 WHEN THE PROCESS IS COMPLETE THE
STEERING COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN.
LIST IS DISTRIBUTED BY THE
8:19-93
C
4
_------_Zockheed
Space Operations Company
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REP.
GSWT TEAM LIST
GSWT STEERING
COMMITTEE
INTEGRATION TEAM
4,
FYXX GSWT INTEGRATED PRIORITY LIST
PROGRAM CAP EQUIP,
MGMT
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TEAM NO. 31
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ATTACI-_NT A-2 3t
J
/
REoUIREO
P1-1 -
PI-2 --
p 1--.,:.1-
" P1--4
GSWT STEr-:"RI/,_G COMMI'FI'EE - PRI©RIT'f DEFINITIONS
ITEMS THAT" ARE:
R_.qulramenis d]c_,aied by dlawlng, spec{flc_iJ'on, or dbecflve te supporl a
s_ecillc mlssinn eIlec_.lvily
MadlllcaUons teqult_d {o suppnr! a sp__c!ll,:flIgh(systemlpr-,yioa,4requite-
men! dlc_.uledbv dr_ving, specfflcalJon,or dlrec:N(_
,',,4odltlcallons wt_ich prevenl polentlai loss a( llla, ._avefe lniur,_ or significant
damnge'lo (llgl_t)_az.dware whele _10 prOcadUr.1( hi" operallonrq wor,_nrounds
exist
Modlllca/lon9 which prevont slgnlllc::nl.(>_ hr_) _tocasslng lmpac_
REQUIRED ITEMS THAT:
P2-1 - ,M.Qe(Upgraded de_Icjn tequir_rn_n(s (,,Jtlh ha:srdous h_pilcallons)
P'2.-2- Carre¢1 design de(lclenc!es in p{imnty ._yste,n (,,,,ithhazardous [rnpi{c_tlon_
REGUIREDiTEMSTHAR
PO-1 -
PO-Z -
P3--2 -
PS---I-
p_-_ -
PI or P2 IIem'whele workaround I_ possible
Cortec._ d_slgn d_ilc_enc.;esin buckup sysle,.ns
Meel Upgl nde,'J_equir.ements
,e.'IC:.(:}",Correc 8,design _rdocumentatlon [nconsls' , "_ _
Reduc_ {ha p_.olentlat o( IniUryto perse_nei or potential damage _c illght
hardw_,re wtlef_ a procadur._l or oper_l(onal ,,vo_kuround exis;s.
DEStRASL.'= ITEMS THAT./_,RE NEEDED TO:
P4-I --
P,_--2 -
P4-3
OESIRABLE
Prevent oh._It:-_c_nce---:.su._edprublerns
Enhance apev;;dons wiLh shorl.-i_.tm,payb::c!-(leT,S than i year)
Improve processing operations tc :educe sc.he(_uie_Isk.
ITEMS WITH 1,10 QUANTIFIABLE EFFECT 014 PRC_C2SSING '3UT WILL:
P5-I -
P5-2 -
P5-3 -
C;eale {mpruved prac',Ica_or dlic!enc!es
Enl_nca proc_slng ,,,ill_Ioncj-:.ermpayhack (more !hen i year)
Upgrade..fy_tem_ lo al{(jn:wilh cun e:_t Gouernm,:nl ;e,.jutntlons.
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LOCKHEED SPACE OPERATIONS COMPANY
INTERDEPARTMENTAL COI_'IUNICATION
TO: 0iszribu_ion
DATE- March ZP, 199_
CONTROL NUMBER- _201-9_-0_9
DEPT. BLDG. MAIL
NO. NO. CODE
FROM: J.F. White
SUBJECT:
DEPT. BLDG. ,MAIL
NO. 32-01 NO. LET-2 CODE LSO-O:2 PHONE 383-2200
_xz. 2759
REPLAC_,ENT OF THE P-CUT 0URING ESR PR!ORITiZAT_ON
Currenz!y a P-CUT is assigned :o each E_R _s it is entered in C?_OS. The 9-CUT
is useful :o _he Steering Commizzee [ncegrzzion Team _uring zhe yearly
priori_izaZion process, buz has noz been he!pfu] zo z_e _WT's in _riorlzizing
zhe E_Rs on zmeir individual _aam iiszs.
The GSWT SteerinQ. Commie:.__:o is inzroducinQ, a new mezhodology _o use in
determining Zhe priority of ESRs wi:hin the GSWT syszem zna_ wil! re_iece the
P-CUT. This new syszem czlled "the a-mazrix mezmo_" is simoler _nd more
szr_ign_ forward and shoul_ benefi: your GSWT in eva_uazinm ,.here _n ZSR _nould
fiz on your respeczive team !iszs. A cooy of zhe mezmod is azz_cnee znd a
brief descripzion of each major mazrix foilows-
Frequent 7 of 0oerazion-
Each ESR has a problem condi:ion or even_ thaz is described in 31ocx i6 of zhe
ZSR form. This problem con¢izion is normally _he resuIZ of _he per_ormanc_ of
some operation _uch as a par:icular sequence of an 0MI or WAC. This matrix
clrrela:es the number of _imes _his ooera:ion occurs per flow or monzh to a
numerica] value. The more frequen_ :he occurrenc_ the higner _he value.
Processinm [moacz/Imorovement-
This mazrix equates the Block 16 pro01em _o a Vehicle Qrocessing imoac:. This
imoacZ should be a direcz resui_ of the problem condition, _ "slngie ooin_
f_ilure" scenario ra_her _han _elyin_ on a series of failures zo czuse z 'aorsz
czse siruazion.
Likelihood of Occurrence"
This mazrlx cnncerns _he pro0abi!iZy of zhe prooiem con_i-_en or event
_.r, ng within _ _iven. :ime frame. A h_aner. _oz_n_i-'_ of _c__r:__c=_ is
asslgne_ a higher va]ue in zme maZ_ix.
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Cost Assessment:
The first step in performing this matrix is to fill out the 2_R Evaluation-Cost
impact sheet. This data is similar to the ROM data that has been required in
the past. When the sheet is complete, you will have calculace_ _he months :0
_ay back required to perform the "Cos: Assessment" matrix. On the "Cost
Assessment" matrix, selec% the appropriate pay back period and numerical value
associated with the pay back period.
Multiply the numerical values obtained from the four ma_rices together co
obtain a score for the ESR under evaluation. This sc_re, when compared to che
scores on other ESRs on your list, should help you understznd wnere :his ESR
should be prioritized.
• p° Q_Please implement this system immediately. Beginning w_h the upcoming ri.b
Integrated Priority Process starting in .April of this year, at 7east :he t_p
_hree priorities on your team list need to have been evalua_ee and selected
using the 4-matrix method. (Retain the work shee_s for _hese three ESRs to
provide background data to support your priority). Thi_ process is _o be useo
on all new ESRs. Use t_e attached shee_s to perform this evaluation. Update
the CMOS P-CUT field for t_ese rTrst _r__ wi_h tne numerical score obtained
from the matrices. In the summer, the GSWT data fie!es in CMDS will me
revised to allow you to input this information directly inz_ C_DS. Also, SPL
BM-310 (2)K is in the process of being revise_ to reflect this change. In zne
interim, make the changes to your team list usinm the atzacmed information. If
you have any questions, contact your GSWT Steerinm Committee Representative.
" F _h_
JFW:!m
Attachments: A/S
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ESR ASSESSMENT CRITERIA SCORE
FREQUENCY OF OPERATION
5 Multiple Times Per Flow/Month
4 Once Per Flow/Month - Critical Path
3 Once Per Flow/Month - Non Critical Path
2 1-5/OMDP/2 Years
1 Contingency Operation Only
PROCESSING IMPACT/IMPROVEMENT
5 More Then 24 Hour Serial Flow Time
4: More Then 8 Less Then 24 Hour Serial Fiow Time
3 Less Then 8 Hour Serial Flow Time
2 More Then 24 Hour Parallel Flow Time
1 Less Then 24 Hour Parallel FIow Time
LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURRENCE
4 Expected To Happen Within The Next Flow/Month
3 Could Happen Within The Next Flows,'6 Months
2 Could Happen Within Next 12 F]ows/18 Months
1 Not Expected To Happen In The Next 16 Flows,'2 Years
COST ASSESSMENT (SCORE FROM REVERSE SIDE)
5 Payback Within 3 Months
4 Payback Between 3 and 6 Months
3 Payback Between 6 and 12 Months
2 Payback Between 1 and 2 Years
1 Payback Longer Then 2 Years
TOTAL
Determine the appropriate c!assification of the ESR within each category.
Multfoly the score of each category together to determine the ESR rating. The
rating will be compared with other ESR's to prioritize next year's mcdification
budget. The ratings will be independently verified cudng the GSWq" lntegra,.ion
Process.
Poor
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COST ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
COST OF PROPOSAL: (ROM)
Engineering M.H. @ $40.00 $
Material $
Labor M.H. @ $40.00 $
FPC $.
35
TOTAL COST $ (A)
"*1BENEFIT OF PROPOSAL*
OPERATIONAL SAVINGS: (ANNUAL)
$
$
TOTAL
( M.H. (Old Way) -
( Consumables (Old)-
($_ Energy (Old) -
M.H. (New Way) X $40.00 = $
Consumables (New) = $
Energy (New) = $
P.M.M.H.s/Yr (New) X $40.00 = $
P.M. Mat'l (New) ) = $
Corrective M.H. (New) X $40.00 = $
Correctible Mat'1 (New) ) = $
MAINTENANCE SAVINGS: (ANNUAL)
4
(P.M. MH.s_f'r (Old)
(P.M. Mat'1 (Old)
Corrective M.H. (Old)
(Corrective Mat'l (Old)
OTHER SAVINGS (ANNUAL) $
X 12 =
(D)
TOTAL
Months To Payback
PAYBACK:
A
P=
B+C÷D
If savings are negative for any factor, add total algebraically.
To be used with ESR Assessment Matrix
(B)
V
(C)
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Appendix B
Comments on Selected ESRs from the
Costs, Risks, and Values Evaluation (CRAVE) Perspective
by
Pra:f _og!ekar
Costs, Risks, and Values Evaluation (CRAVE) is a methodology. T_ac is, it is a way of
thinking -- armed with c_--rain ftmdamental prmmples and concepts -- aad a way of
analyzing available deci.sion alternatives using _mafionaLIy appropriate techniques and tooLs
from a large body of methods consistent ,m± the ftmdamental principles and concepts. A
methodolog3, focuses on both the tectmiaues and the tn'ocesses used in re!evant decision-
making.
Consequently, the first step in applying CRAVE to the problem of ESR rank-ordering is
to understand the complexity., diversity, and situational specificity of the ESRs in terms
of
a) r.be magnitudes of costs, risks, azld benefits involved.,
b) the degree to which these magnitudes could be quantitafive!y measured,
c) the degee to whic,k re_md decisions a.ffec: an ESR's costs and benefits,
d) the de_-ee to which sub-dec.sioa elements (such as the timing of implementation or
availability, of quantity discounts) affec: the pe.m:inent cos= and benefits, and
E) any other _-incai elements.
Ordy when we undersmaad dais compie,_ty aad dive_-'s'ky can we _-'eate a stumble adaptation of
_e CRAVE methodology _o ESR pnonfizafion. Towards zbat end, I studied severai ESR.s ha
_e,--ms of the modifications they were proposing, they esfimamd costs, ,.'-ksks, benefits, ESR
scorES, payback periods, etc. I r._i_Efi "-O sevErai lead en__nee.-"s, ESR champions, steering
commit-me members, accounting professionals, and third paraes familiar ._rh sveeific ESILs
and/or familiar with the GSWT process.
The following comments reflect my informed assessments of the seiectea ESRs, as well
as my observations about the ESR prioritization process. Some readers ,-nay find these
'comments too cryptic, but of aec*..ssity, I have assumed that readers are reasonably familiar
with the se!ec_ed ESKs and their resoecfive J--M assessments.
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[(14453. "New Hydraulic Pump Units"
1. An ESR that does not belong.
In terms of costs, this ESR stands out as the most important one to analyze carefully. Insofar
as its estimated costs ($3.8M for Option A and $2.8M for Option A1) exceed the combined
costs of all 16 remaining ESRs on TV's FY95 priority list (See Figure 4), it is unfair axed
irrational to treat this as just another ESR to be rank-ordered as Priority 1, or 4 (as the
Steering Committee did), or 17. Thus, in my opinion this ESR does not belong to the GSWT
pfioritization process. If a comparison with other ESRs must be done, the appropriate
question would be whether or not the benefits of this ESR exceed the sum total of the benefits
of all remaining ESRs. But such a comparison would be similar to asking whether the value
of buying a house exceeds the value of feeding and clothing ourselves for several years. With
that kind of a comparison, we would never buy a house!
In our personal lives, although some sacrifices in the amounts we spend on food and clothing
are necessary to buy a house, through devices such as a mortgage, we manage to buy a house
without starving. Similarly, organizations must find ways to spend on capital equipment
without jeopardizing their short-term survival. The best way to do that is to set aside two
separate funds for capital expenditures and operational expenditures, and to avoid any
comparison of a project in the capital expenditure category with projects in the operational
expenditure category.
At KSC, we do have different funds and funding mechanisms to take care of capital versus
operational items. Unfortunately, in the GSWT prioritization process, we have not
stopped comparing capital ESRs with operational ESRs.
2. Let them fight with their equals.
If at all, I would have compared this ESR with others costing $1M or more.
3. Widely different cost estimates.
As I dug deeper into this ESR, I came across several different cost estimates ranging from
$1.8M to 3.8M without much explanation for why the estimates were so widely different. I
was told not to be surprised if it ends up costing $5M by the time it is actuaUy implemented.
_More importandy, it seems that with the accounting system at KSC, even in retrospect, we
may never find out how much an ESR really costs. The most disturbing thing for me is the
fact that the GSWT Steering Committee concerns itself neither with the magnitude of the cost
estimates nor with the reliability of those estimates. Finally, I am disturbed to note that
KSC culture is so oblivious to cost consideration.
304
38
4. If I were King:
If I were King, considering that
a) this ESR offers a payback from its quantified benefits (from savings in reduced PRs
and reduced O&M expenses) within six to eight years,
b) additionally, it offers intangible benefits such as avoidance of flight-critical delays,
reduction of noise, and reduction of elec_c shock hazard, that have not been
quantified,
c) the current equipment is 17 years oId and it must be replacexi within the next two or
three years, and
d) proper timing (coordinated with the construction of Fluid Support Stations in the two
OPF bays) is very important in the case of this ESR, and can save as much as $1M,
I would have approved this ESR for FY94. Perhaps it is still not too late.
K75040. PGHM Anti-Free Wheel Mod
1. Disguised motivation.
It seems that the GSWT team's real motivation is to modernize and automate PGHM
operations -- a very desirable goal. However, knowing the KSC culture of approving
primarily (perhaps only) safety related ESRs, the champions of this ESR have framed its
justification in terms of avoiding potential damage to cryogenic or hypergolic payloads. The
fact is that given the precautions we take and the manpower we allocate to PGHM operations,
the likelhhood of Z wheel operations causing any major damage to payload is one in several
thousand.
2. Inconsistent cost and payback estimates.
Although an October 1993 study estimates the cost of this ESR to be $49K, the ESR score
calculations are based on a cost of $108K. No one on the GSWT Steering Committee is
charged specifically with the responsibility to identify and correct such inconsistencies.
Indeed, the steering committee does not know how much expenditure it is authorizing by
putting an ESR on its priority list.
Similarly, the GSWT team seems to have made a mistake in reporting that this ESRs payback
as 17.6 months when they meant 11.6 years./ Once again, the mistake went undetected by the
steering committee.
3. Bite the bullet or forget it!
I am not an engineer, but it seems to me that if we are going to spend S108K, we ought to
attain a much greater degree of automation than reptacing a bail and screw mechanism with a
machine screw[
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K15813. EPDM Cover Installation Tool
1, The steering committee does catch some mistakes.
Instead of multiplying, the GSWT team had added the scores on the four matrices. The
steering committee corrected that mistake. The steering committee also seems to have
challenged the team's claim of a rating of 4 on the Processing Impact factor and corrected it to
a rating of 2.
2. Likelihood factor incorrectly rated.
On the other hand, the steering committee seems to have missed the fact that the GSWT team
interpreted this factor to mean "likeLihood that the operation will be performed" rather than
"likelihood that a mishap or probIem condition would occur."
3. Operational savings overestimated.
A reality check suggests that the estimated saving of eight man-hours per EPDM cover
installation exceeds the actual man-hours currendy required for this operation! A payback
period of four years may be more accurate. Of course, that is sufficient considering the
reduction in the risk of damaging the covers -- a benefit rtot quantified in the payback
calculation. :
K153991. Main Door Windlocks Pin Insertion
1. Isn't there a cheaper way?
While it makes sense to avoid a broomstick approach (particularly in the Space Program),
certainly the replacement should not cost $28K.
2. Look for economies of scale.
This ESR highlights the need to make certain changes in Pad A and Pad B configurations
simultaneously rather than one at a time. Had we done that, the incremental cost of the
device for Pad A could have been of the order of $5K rather than $28K.
V
Kl1794. An Additional Winch to Recover from ESP/ECP Platform Tilt
1. Counting benefits that are impossible to obtain through the proposed ESR.
This ESR estimates the payback period for its investment to be .067 months (or two days)!
To me this ESR represents the case of a carelessly exaggerated claims. An assumption
V
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underlying this claim is that by recovering from a tilt of the ESP/ECP platform we will save
the cost of an SSME ($60M). The fact is, the damage due to the tilt would be already done
and straightening out the platform will not in itself save the S_ME. We will have to undertake
all the necessary repairs, and tests as well. If having an additional winch would prevent a
potential tilt, then we could count the avoided damage times the probability that the damage
would occur in the absence of the new winch as a saving due to this ESR.
Another implied assumption in this payback calculation is that a ESP/ECP platform tilt will
occur with certainty. Although with aging winches, the probability of a tilt occuzring is
increasing, I would say that it is still of the order of one in a hundred.
Yes, we need to refurbish our aging winches, but this is hardly a rational way of justifying
that. I am most surprised that the steering committee did not challenge these payback
calculations.
2. Inadequacy of the cost assessment worksheet
It is clear that 4--M's design of the Cost Assessment Worksheet cannot accommodate the
capture of all relevant risk and benefits associated with this ESR.
3. Why insist on an exact duplicate of existing winches?
I am told that for the $340K cost of this ESR, instead of buying one winch that duplicates
cresting winches in form and function, one could easily buy four commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) winches that incorporate better technology and avoids single point failures.
Such a purchase of four new winches would allow us
a) to use them together for the safest hoisting of crucial loads, and
b) to disassemble, inspect, and refurbish at least ten of the existing tweIve winches,
with parts to spare from the other two.
4. The option generating nature of CRAVE.
The suggestion in Comment 3 above shows that the CRAVE methodology not only helps in
the assessment of a given ESR, it has the potential to generate better options.
K15783. KU-Band DEMOD Replacement.
1. Internal inconsistency.
On the one hand, this ESR claims a processing improvement of more than 24 hours of serial
flow time. On the other hand, it says that there will be no monetary payback. This seems
inconsistent. Surely there must be a quantifiable lower bound on the value of a 24-hour serial
flow improvement.
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_° The importance of establishing upper and lower bounds on the values of certain
types of benefits.
It seems important that a trained cost-benefit analyst should establish upper and lower bounds
for the value of the various categories in the Processing Impact/Improvement factor. This is a
very doable task, and it should help us in more rigorous and quantitative assessments of many
ESRs.
3. Work around possible.
As it rams out, this ESR wi.ll not contribute to an improvement of 24 hours of serial flow
time. This is because when the DEMOD does not work, we do have a way to communicate
between ff_ring room and OPF. The trouble is that communication involves routing through
JSC and satellite, etc. Commercially, such a communication could cost as much as $100 per
minute. Luckily, NASA does not have to pay anybody for this communication. However,
we may be impeding or slowing down other vital communication that truly needs the satellite
system. Considering all these factors and the fact its estimated cost is $305K, I found this
ESR to be the most difficult one to decide on.
K15505. Additional HPD Platforms
1. We must develop a simpler and speedier low cost mod (LCM) process.
This is one of the least costly ($4tC) of the ESRs I studied. It seems unfair to burden such
low cost proposals with the same degree of rigor of assessment and rank-ordering as ESRs
costing ten or a hundred times itscost.
2. Estimate minimum benefits in quantitative terms.
Although this ESR made no attempt to calculate its payback period, it would have been easy
to obtain a lower bound on the benefits and an upper bound on that payback. Given that two
injuries have occurred during the last two years, the average cost of these injuries can be seen
as the minimum savings brought by this ESR. Of course, one of my presumptions is that we
have reasonable records from Personnel Department to be able to estimate the costs of those
injuries.
3. If I must rank-order the sample of ESRs I have studied:
Considering the facts that
a) we have already spent the money for the design of the platforms,
b) the incremental costs of the remaining work are so small, and
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x..,/ c) it will avoid the types of injuries to workers that have occurred twice during the
last two years,
this ESR would be my Priority #1.
4. Why re-evaluate?
What I do not understand is why this ESR is being re-evaluated at this stage. The original
version of this ESR calling for the design and implementation was estimated to cost $35K,
and we have already done the design work. I would have assumed that implementation of
that design would not be a new decision point!
15836. Replace Diver Operated Plug (DOP) s/n 4
1. Reasonably quantifiable costs, risks, and benefits.
This a good example of ESRs whose costs, risks, and benefits are reasonably quantifiable.
The use of the 4-M ESR score in such cases would be totally inappropriate. The sole
criterion for rank-ordering among these ESRs should be the payback period---the shorter the
better.
2. Benefits overestimated.
This ESR claims a payback in seven months by estimating an annual saving of $103K when
the cost of a new DOP is only $58K. Based on available information, I would re-estimate the
benefits as below:
The last time DOP s/n 4 failed was two years back. So let us assume that its probability of
failure in a year is 0.5. In the event of a failure, we would spend
One day of sea labor
One day of sea boat rental
PR Generation & Disposition
Materials & Labor to Fix DOP s/n 4
$7,700
5,000
1,600
$34,100
Thus, assuming that a new DOP will have zero probability of failure, the purchase of a new
DOP will help us avoid a cost of $34K with a probability of 0.5. Hence, the expected savings
are (.5)(34K) = 17K per year. This _ves us a payback of 41 months.
To the extent that the probability of DOP s/n 4 failing goes up from year to year, the payback
period may be shorter than my calculation indicates. But certainly it is not as short as seven
months. Of course, as I have indicated elsewhere, if the payback is four years or less, "[
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consider an ESR to be desirable. Such ESRs should be prioritized in the i_ncreasmg order of
their (correctly estimated) payback periods.
3. Look for economies of scale.
Here is another example illustrating the need to take advantage of economies of scale. We
will need one more DOP within a year or two. It would be considerably cheaper if we
ordered two at a time, rather than one now and one a year or two Iater.
4. The need for a qualified analyst to assist GSWT Steering Committee..
I do not expect a steering committee to be able to do the kind of reassessment of benefits I
have done in Comment 2 above. I believe that if we are serious about incorporating cost-
effectiveness considerations in our ESR prioritization, the steering committee must be
assisted by a property trained and impartial analyst whose charge is to challenge the GSWT
teams' logic and the numbers on each ESR.
KI5818. Digital Control Cards for LOX Pumps
1. An ESR we cannot afford not to invest in.
This ESR proposes to spend $46K in order to save three cold flows (LOX') per year, worth
$25K per flow. Assuming these numbers are correct, KSC must take $46K from its liquid
oxygen (LOX) budget to fund this ESR immediately, so that we will save $29K this year and
we will have $75K extra in future years for other desirable projects.
2. Use the right funding source.
As I see it, this ESR should be funded from the LOX budget. It should not compete with
other ESRs for other sources of funds. Any comparison of this ESR with other ESRs would
be unfair to both.
K14515. Prime Backup HGDS Infinite Zero Gas Source
L Not on GSWT steering committee's priority list, very correctly.
This ESR is not one of the Top 17 on TV's fist, but it is on the "open ESR" database. Yet, I
have included it in this review primarily because I want to make the following points.
2. Reasonably quantifiable costs and benefits.
From the data on this ESR, it seems clear _at the COSTS, risks, and benefits are reasonably
quantifiable, and hence payback ought to be the sole criterion for this ESRs rank-ordering.
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. An ESR that deserves to be rejected once and for all, dosed, and deleted from
the database.
This ESR proposes to spend $118K to be able to use facility GN2 gas in place of ultra pure
GN2 in everyday standby purge operations, so as to obtain an estimated savings of $7K per
year. There are no other intangible benefits associated with this ES1L Thus, this ESR will
take 16 years to payback!
I believe that such ESRs ought to be rejected once and for all, closed, and deleted from the
"open ESR database" so that the GSWT steering committee is not burdened with its
consideration year after year, and our computer systems are not burdened with carrying
unnecessary data.
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